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Abstract
In Cartesian physics the rejection of the atomism is the conse-
quence of denying the vacuum. The motion of finitely small and
rigid bodies in the space without vacuum can only be limited.
The multifarious and variable motion assumed by mechanical
philosophy is not possible due to geometrical restraints. There-
fore the change of the physical bodies or sets of bodies is indis-
pensable.
If we suppose that in Cartesian physics the shape and size of
primary bodies is constant, chaotic motion is only possible if
a certain proportion of the bodies are indefinitely small as op-
posed to finitely small atoms. These indefinitely small particles
build up sets of bodies able to change their shape within the
gaps between larger bodies.
Consequently, rejecting atomism and assuming indefinite di-
visibility by Descartes does not mean that primary bodies
change their shape and size as part of the physical processes
but only that there exist indefinitely small particles besides the
finitely small bodies that are similar to atoms.
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Introduction
In this paper, an aspect of Descartes’ Physics has been ex-
amined, which, although often referenced, has not been studied
in depth yet. In Principles of Philosophy Part II, Descartes dis-
cusses the indefinite (infinite) divisibility of matter.1“We like-
wise discover that there cannot exist any atoms, . . . For how-
ever small we suppose these parts to be, yet because they are
necessarily extended, we are always able in thought to divide
any one of them into two or more smaller parts. . . ” (Descartes,
[1, II.20]). Why did Descartes reject atomism? Why was the
question of divisibility so important for Descartes that he de-
voted a separate point to it? In the first part of this study, the
common characteristics of, and the differences between, atom-
ist and Cartesian physics have been reviewed. It has been ar-
gued that both the atoms and Descartes’ corpuscles are indivisi-
ble bodies of unchanged size and shape, and that changes in the
shape of simple bodies are therefore also inconceivable in Carte-
sian physics. It has been assumed that the “indefinite divisibility
of matter” entails the existence of point-like bodies. Further-
more, it has also been argued that atoms could only perform
limited motion in a void. Lastly, the fact that various motions
of small bodies in a void, as assumed by mechanical philoso-
phy, are possible if a certain proportion of the small bodies is
infinitely small, has been proved. It has been argued that this is
the main reason why Descartes took a stand against the atomist
theory.
1 Descartes and the atomists
1.1 Common features and differences
Throughout his life, Descartes took great care to distinguish
his own philosophy from the atomist doctrines, which were re-
visited in the seventeenth century. Both Descartes’ theory and
atomist theories explained the phenomena of the world with the
motion of small and imperceptible bodies (Garber, [4, p. 117]).
Some of Descartes’ readers categorized him as an atomist be-
1 Descartes reserves the term “infinite” for God alone and refers to created
things as “indefinite.” Cf. Principles of Philosophy Part I 26-27 for more detail.
For the sake of convenience, the term “infinite divisibility” is used, which is
more in accordance with recent terminology.
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cause of the following three common points between his theo-
ries and those of the atomists: (a) the motion of various small
bodies is responsible for sensory properties, such as color, heat,
and taste; (b) the universe is infinite and contains an indefinite
number of worlds with their own suns and stars; and (c) not only
celestial bodies, but plants and animals had also evolved out of
an initial chaos in a “purely natural way” (Garber, [4, pp. 118–
119]). Descartes was familiar with atomist theories and must
have indeed been influenced by atomist thinking.2
Nevertheless, in his later works, he consciously took a stand
against atomists.3One of his motives could have been the pride
that he took in his own discoveries (Garber, [4, p. 119]). Another
motive could have been that he did not want his theory to be
confused with the atomist theories that, in certain aspects, were
contrary to the Christian doctrines. However, the sources do not
allow us to decide whether Descartes shared the atomist point of
view regarding the indivisibility of atoms at the beginning of his
relationship with Beeckman. Although he used the term “atom”
at certain points, he did not use it in the exact atomist sense
of the word. However, his dismissal of atomism had become
evident by 1630 (Garber, [4, p. 121]).
It is commonly believed that Cartesian physics differs from
the atomist doctrines in at least two important points, i.e., it
assumes the infinite divisibility and denies vacuum. But how
exactly does Descartes’ view differ from the atomist theories?
Let us first examine the issue of vacuum. The fundamental as-
sumption of atomist doctrines is that atoms move in vacuum. As
Descartes rejected the existence of occult entities, he had to ex-
plain the phenomena with the collision and pressure of particles.
Hence, he had to accept the theory of vortex motion. However,
vortex motion would not have operated in vacuum.4 Therefore,
Descartes, as opposed to atomists, denied the existence of vac-
2 See Garber for more detail, e.g. “Descartes was by no means alone in op-
posing the philosophy of the schools. As I noted earlier, there had been numer-
ous attacks on the Aristotelian natural philosophy by the time Descartes learned
his physics at school, various varieties of Platonism, Hermeticism, the Chemical
Philosophy of Paracelsus, among other movements. But most important to un-
derstanding Descartes was the revival of ancient atomism. . . . the ancient atom-
ists. . . attempted to explain the characteristic behavior of bodies, not in terms of
substantial forms, but in terms of size, shape, and motion of the smaller bodies,
atoms, that make up the grosser bodies of everyday experience,. . . ” (Garber,
[5, p. 287]).
3 See, e.g., in 1644, Principles of Philosophy (Descartes, [3, II.20])
4
“. . . whereas in La Lumiere Descartes was reluctant to reject the existence
of a void, in the Principles the nonexistence of a void becomes one of the central
principles of his philosophy of nature. The shift is important because it elimi-
nates, I think, a potential gap in his theory. In La Lumiere Descartes restricted
his attention to that determinate region between the earth and the stars of the
principal heaven because he was uncertain whether a void existed beyond this
region. A natural question arises here, however: If a void exists beyond this
region, how would this affect Descartes’ cosmogony (especially his theory of
vortex motion)? Such a question reveals a potential gap in Descartes’ account in
La Lumiere. In the Principles, however, there is and can be no void anywhere in
the universe. Hence, the question never arises and the gap disappears.” (Lynes,
[8, p. 70])
uum.
It is important to emphasize that once Descartes had taken a
stand to deny vacuum, it also had a bearing on the divisibility of
matter. In the next section, how the infinite divisibility of matter
inevitably follows from the rejection of the existence of vacuum
and the assumption of irregular motion has been discussed.
1.2 Bodies in Cartesian physics
According to atomist theories, the world is made up of atoms:
small, invisible, and indivisible bodies that are unchanged over
time. Mechanical philosophy also assumes the existence of
small and invisible bodies. Both the theories hold that the move-
ment of these bodies is responsible for the phenomena of the
sensual world.5 The atoms themselves remain unchanged during
the phenomena. What are the corpuscles of mechanical physics
like? What does “the infinite divisibility of matter” mean in me-
chanical philosophy? Is it possible that according to Cartesian
physics, the bodies themselves change during the phenomena?
Here, special or extraordinary events (such as the creation of the
world or the fraction of the particles of light) are not considered,
but the typical behavior of the bodies. Or does “the infinite di-
visibility of matter” signify that atoms, i.e., finitely small bodies
are not the only group that exist?
Here, the latter interpretation is presumed to be correct.
Atoms as the only finitely small particles do not exist, but there
are bodies of homogeneous material that only differ in size and
shape. These bodies (corpuscles in the Cartesian terminology)
exist continually over time, similarly to atoms. In my inter-
pretation the difference between corpuscules and atoms is that
corpuscules can not be only finitely small, but also infinitely
small particles (so-called point-like bodies).6 Mechanical phi-
losophy explains all the phenomena with the motion of small
bodies. Therefore, changes in these bodies during motion can-
not be among the phenomena employed for explanation. We
have to assume that these bodies are relatively constant both in
terms of their shape and size. However, it does not mean that
they cannot divide under certain circumstances or that they are
uniform in size or shape. In Cartesian physics, the bodies com-
5See the positions of Clarke and Lynes: “The speculations about matter on
which Descartes’ theory of matter and, subsequently, his concept of science
depend include the assumption that the size, shape and motion of small particles
of matter would be adequate to explain all their physical effects, including the
physical effects on our sensory faculties which stimulate sensations.” (Clarke,
[2, p. 262]) or “. . . Descartes develops a ‘corpuscularian’ theory of matter – i.e.,
matter consists of an indefinitely large number of small parts, . . . such that the
behavior of collections of these small parts is a function of the behavior of the
smaller parts of which they are composed.” (Lynes, [8, p. 59])
6 Garber identifies atomist influences in Cartesian theory, “Descartes’
physics wound up retaining a number of crucial features of the physics he was
taught in school, and differing from the world of the atomists; most notably,
Descartes rejected the indivisible atoms and empty spaces . . . But Descartes’
rejection of the forms and matter of the schools, and his adoption of the mech-
anist program for explaining everything in the physical world in terms of size,
shape, and motion of the corpuscles that make up bodies, is hardly conceivable
without the influence of atomist thought.” (Garber, [5, pp. 287–288])
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posing the world are of various sizes and shapes, but, similar
to atoms, during collisions, they behave as constant and solid
bodies made up of perfectly homogeneous material.7
Fig. 1. Rings of circularly moving bodies in Principles of Philosophy, II.
33-34.
1.3 Divisibility
If, as it has been argued, Cartesian physics assumes that cor-
puscles are unchangeable, two questions need to be answered. 1.
What does the “infinite divisibility of matter” exactly mean and
2. Why was it necessary for Descartes to declare the indefinite
divisibility of matter?
It is easy to see that certain finitely small bodies (e.g., cubes)
are also able to fill the space without vacuum. Assuming the
indefinite divisibility of matter was necessary for Descartes not
only to explain the filling of space without vacuum, but also the
motion in this space. The ring of circularly moving bodies can
only operate in certain cases if we assume the indefinite divisi-
bility of matter. Descartes wrote the following in Principles of
Philosophy II. 34:
“It must however, be admitted that in the case of this motion
we come upon something the truth of which our mind perceives,
while at the same time being unable to grasp exactly how it oc-
curs. For what happens is an infinite, or indefinite, division of
the various particles of matter; and the resulting subdivisions
are so numerous that however small we make a particle in our
thought, we always understand that it is in fact divided into other
still smaller particles. For it is impossible for the matter, which
now fills space G successively to fill all the spaces between G
and E, which get gradually smaller by countless stages, unless
7Garber’s description of the atoms also holds true with respect to Descartes’
corpuscles. The difference is that the latter can not only be finitely, but also
infinitely small. Still, they are as indivisible and unchangeable as atoms, “In
denying the possibility of a vacuum, Descartes rejected one of the central doc-
trines of atomist tradition. . . Another central atomist doctrine fares little better
on Descartes’ conception of body. Important to the atomists was the view that
the world of bodies is made up of indivisible and indestructible atoms. . . . Atoms
are, thus, indivisible unchangeable bodies, the ultimate parts into which bodies
can be divided and from which they can be constructed.” (Garber, [5, p. 300])
some part of that matter adjust its shape to the innumerable dif-
ferent volumes of those spaces. And for this to come about, it
is necessary that all its imaginable particles, which are in fact
innumerable, should shift their relative positions to some tiny
extent. This minute shifting of position is a true case of divi-
sion.” (Descartes, 1996, II.34)
In the previous section, it has been argued that corpuscles in
Cartesian physics are bodies of unchangeable shape and size.
How can we reconcile this statement with the one that the ring of
circularly moving bodies can only operate if matter “gets gradu-
ally smaller” and changes its shape in accordance with the space
available? Are the corpuscles constant or do they change their
shape and size? One possible answer is that these bodies are
unchangeable in certain cases and are indefinitely divisible in
others.8 In the narrowing arm of the ring, bodies divide into
infinite parts, and then reunite in the widening arm. Therefore,
on the one hand, we can state that the size of the bodies changes
during the motion (so that motion would be possible) and, on the
other hand, we can consider that the motion of constant bodies
explains the various phenomena. However, the other possible
answer seems to offer a better solution. We do not assume that
the size and shape of the moving bodies change within the ring
of circularly moving bodies. Rather, we presume that a part of
the bodies is ab ovo infinitely small, and the presence of these
point-like bodies makes motion possible within the ring of cir-
cularly moving bodies.9 At the same time, we can state that
neither point-like nor larger bodies change their shape or size,
which means that, similar to atoms, they are constant during
physical processes.10
In this paper, the difference between “bodies” and “parts of
matter” or between “the divisibility of bodies” and the “divisi-
bility of matter” in Cartesian physics have not been examined.
It has been merely assumed t hat the “indefinite divisibility of
matter” does not indicate that corpuscles would change their
shape and size during physical processes, but rather that upon
the creation (or evolution) of the world, not only finitely small,
but also point-like bodies, were formed out of matter. If we ac-
cept this hypothesis, we may understand why Descartes rejected
atomism, and may not be forced to abandon our theorem that
corpuscles do not change during physical processes. Descartes
conceives bodies differently from the atomists. He holds that
point-like bodies exist, and that their presence in the ring of cir-
8 Garber holds that bodies are indefinitely divided under given circum-
stances. However, he fails to offer an explanation as to what they are under
different circumstances or what happens to them after being divided, “Descartes
has no arguments intended directly to show that all bodies are naturally divisi-
ble. But he does think that in certain circumstances, at least, bodies are actually
divided ad infinitum, or, as he might put it, ad indefinitum. To understand the
grounds for this claim we must consider a circumstance he discusses in Pr II 33.”
(Garber, [4, p. 125])
9 See Garber’s opinion, “. . . the matter going in such a path must actually be
divided into indefinitely small parts, . . . ” (Garber, [4, p. 126])
10 We must not forget that bodies may divide at times, but we consider these
cases unique and extraordinary.
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cularly moving bodies makes motion possible.11
If “the indefinite divisibility of matter” entails the existence
of point-like bodies rather than the change in the bodies during
physical processes, we must show that this assumption is in fact
necessary for motion to develop in a void. Both Descartes and
Garber categorically stated that infinitely small bodies are re-
quired for motion in a void. However, neither Descartes (who,
in my opinion, saw the problem of motion clearly) nor Garber
(who recognized the significance of point-like bodies) offered a
detailed explanation as to why motion was impossible in a space
filled without vacuum with finite bodies, e.g., atoms. The ques-
tion is not only how bodies are able to move in the narrowing
arm of the ring of circularly moving bodies, but also how mo-
tion can get started at all. In the following section, it has been
proved that it is indispensable for motion in a void that a con-
siderable proportion of the bodies filling the space are infinitely
small. This is the reason why it was important for Descartes to
clearly differentiate himself from the atomists.
2 How is the random motion of small particles possible
in a void?
Let us consider how motion is generally possible in a matter
filling the space without vacuum. We must realize that motion,
or even setting the bodies into motion, will be limited. In the
following section, the conditions under which the notion that
“extensive bodies filling the whole space may only have a ran-
dom motion governed by mechanical laws in a void” can be true
have been examined.
2.1 Motion can either be discrete or continuous
Discrete motion signifies that at successive but separate points
in time, bodies fill the space without a void. As the place that
the particle may take up in the consecutive moments is not de-
termined, it might as well be possible that particles move into
places far from the ones occupied by them in the preceding
moment, provided a geometrical configuration gets created, in
which they perfectly fit into. For example, we can consider it as
a discrete motion, when in a space filled with cubes, the cubes
occupy the neighboring places in a series of leaps.
Motion is continuous when a body can only occupy contigu-
ous places and only in a continuous way. This means that it
shall perambulate all the points in between. Descartes conceived
motion in this latter sense. Motion is continuous according to
Descartes, and that only contiguous places can be occupied and
discrete motion is ruled out. At the same time, this also asserts
11 In Garber’s view, the existence of point-like bodies is necessary for motion
in a void, “The actual division of matter into indefinitely small parts, then, is
required so that in moving, the incompressible and inexpandable material sub-
stance not produce a vacuum, a place void of body. This view, that matter must
be indefinitely divisible and sometimes indefinitely divided in order to prevent a
vacuum, goes back to Descartes’ World and to the correspondence that precedes
it.” (Garber, [4, p. 126])
Fig. 2. Motion in discrete space. Cube 1 may not get in the place of Cube 2
or Cube 2 in that of Cube 3 continually, only by leaps
that if contiguous bodies are unable to move in a way that would
allow for a given body to perfectly fill the resulting new space,
motion may only start in a limited way. However, the likelihood
of this case, i.e., contiguous bodies perfectly filling the space
occurring during motion, is minimal.
2.2 The deformation of bodies as a precondition of motion
Unlikely as it may sound, the idea of contiguous bodies
rolling on one another is exactly how mechanical philosophy
wants to explain the phenomena occurring in the world. In a
space filled with bodies of various shapes, bodies moving in dif-
ferent directions and at different speeds collide with one another,
transfer a part of their quantity of motion to each other, and
change their direction of movement upon impact. In Descartes’
physics (beyond, or rather, prior to the mechanical impact rules),
a very important condition was introduced to the system to limit
the freedom of motion. Motion is possible if no vacuum is gen-
erated in the interim, which means that there must be a fitting
body next to each resultant gap, and this causes problems. Let
us, for instance, examine the roll of two balls over one another.
What guarantees that in their direct neighborhood, there is a
properly positioned particle of the right shape with the ability of
filling the resultant gap and is unrestricted in its motion? Clearly,
there is no such guarantee. In all likelihoods, what we will find
is a particle next to the balls that fits in the former gap and thus
has a completely different shape.
In fact, a properly wedged system cannot move. Descartes’
world is made up of particles of various shapes rather than balls
of different sizes. They are unable to roll over one another once
their surfaces meet. Furthermore, they will hold each other and
block each other’s motion at the same time. Because of the geo-
metrical constraints, this system is incapable of movement.12
Bodies (or at least some of them) need to be able to change
12 Lynes prompts the question that he fails to answer, “How can the parts
move incessantly unless there are empty spaces between them? . . . Descartes’
response to this query is both interesting and cautious. He admits that he would
have difficulty responding if he had not recognized by diverse experiences that
the movements in the world are in some sense circular. . . ” (Lynes, [8, p. 59])
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Fig. 3. A wedged system.
their shape to move. Lynes asserted at various points that par-
ticles of the first element are capable of doing so.13 However,
he made different statements at other times.14 We can inter-
pret Descartes’ position correctly if we consider extension, i.e.,
size, as a body’s unchanged property, defined in terms of length,
breadth, and depth. Descartes more specifically stated, “. . . but
each substance has one principal property which constitutes its
nature or essence, and to which all its other properties referred.
Thus, extension in length, breadth and depth constitutes the na-
ture of corporeal substance; ...” (Descartes, [3, I.53]) Accord-
ingly, “extension” measured in the three spatial dimensions is a
body’s constant property. Hence, deformation as a possibility
must be dismissed.15
13
“The matter which has broken off the surfaces of (E2) would have acquired
a much more rapid motion than those of (E2) and would have become capable of
dividing and changing their shape at every moment in order to adapt themselves
to the places into which they must fit around these (E2). Descartes calls this
matter of the first element (E1).” (Lynes [8, p. 63]) or “Matter of the first element
(E1) fills all the interspaces that the parts of (E2), being spherical, leave around
them. However, there are more parts of (E1) than are required to fill these places’
(Lynes [8, p. 63]) or ‘It differs from (E2) in its size, figure, and movement – the
parts of (E1) are smaller than those of (E2); they adapt more easily than those of
(E2) and consequently have no determinate figure (while (E2) are spherical;. . . ”
(Lynes, [8, p. 70])
14
“It is important to remember that for Descartes (Law 1) does not pertain
only to motion/rest but size and figure as well. For example, if x has a cer-
tain magnitude, it will never become smaller unless it is divided in some way.”
(Lynes, [8, p. 61]) or “. . . in La Lumiere it is not entirely clear why the smallest
parts of (E1) are so easily adaptable as to change figure at every moment. But
in the Principles these parts are now described as extremely slender in figure
which, coupled with Descartes’ rule about surface areas (i.e., the more surface
area a body has, assuming the equality of size and speed, the more easily it is
divisible by other bodies it meets and hence adaptable) helps clearly to explain
this adaptability.” (Lynes, [8, p. 71])
15 Not everybody shares this view. According to Grosholz, individuation is
realized not in geometric, but in kinematic terms: “In Part II, §23-§64, the dis-
cussion of motion and its laws in the Principles . . . , Descartes disqualifies shape
as a principle of unity in physics. Instead, physical unity, whose seat is the activ-
ity of God, is defined in kinematic terms. Physics require specifically physical
principles of individuation which geometry cannot provide. For the items of ge-
ometry, while unities are not individuals but equivalence, constructed by means
which make no appeal to motion.” (Grosholz, [6, p. 121]) or “Either these parts
are individuated by geometric principles, by shape, an alternative he wants to
2.3 Continuous motion of rigid bodies in a void
Let us suppose that small bodies cannot be deformed. In this
case, the rigid bodies either do not move and the whole system is
at permanent rest, or continuous but non-vacuum motion is pos-
sible only if a) everything moves together, so that the position of
the parts is constant relative to each other; b) everything moves
in one vortex; c) everything moves in several embedded vortices;
and d) motion arises from the shift of concentric spherical shells
relative to each other. Further embedded concentric spheres may
also be formed within the spherical shells in which the similarly
embedded spherical shells may shift relative to each other.
We can forbear from the examination of Point a) because
Descartes did not interpret motion as the motion of a whole,
but as the shift of the parts relative to each other. Point b) is the
basic case of Point c), which was rejected by Descartes when
he discussed about the creation of the world. That is, within the
great vortex, he considered the Sun and the fixed stars as the
centers of smaller embedded vortices. Thus, we can presume
that Points c) and d) are similar and only differ in structure, pro-
vided we consider that the vortices consist of concentric rings.
It is in favor of Point c) that Descartes imagined the vortices in
a plain, and that in this way, interlooped vortices are possible,
which is not true if concentric spheres are assumed. However,
Point d) allows for much more variation, as neither the direction
nor the speed of rotation of various spherical shells is defined,
and speed and direction may even be totally independent of each
other. However, theories a)–d) limit the freedom of motion. It is
no longer considered that mechanical rules alone govern the mo-
tion of particles. Radial movements are impossible. Bodies can-
not leave the vortex, or can do so under specific circumstances
only, and can neither change their places occupied within the
vortex. The motion of the bodies relative to each other is in fact
the motion of the surfaces of the respective vortices.
It follows that these models are not in accordance with
Descartes’ texts. Although they do make motion possible with-
out vacuum, they fail to ensure that particles move randomly
while colliding with each other accidentally. Instead, they pre-
define paths that the particles are unable to leave.
3 Why are point-like bodies necessary for motion in a
void?
Having dismissed the possibility of discrete motion, the defor-
mation of bodies, and the assumption that only vortex-type mo-
tion is possible, we will need to find another solution. In Prin-
ciples of Philosophy II.33, Descartes explains his theory of the
rings of circularly moving bodies. How can Descartes’ physics
deny; or they are kinematically individuated. But then he has presupposed the
very individuation he sought to explain. Indeed, Descartes’ definition of motion
itself involves an appeal to the parts of matter as already available. Then it ap-
pears that, while motion requires available parts (certainly the monolith of inert
res extensa cannot be moved), the availability of parts (qua individuated matter)
requires motion. All that can save Descartes from this circularity is individuation
of res extensa by geometric principles alone.” (Grosholz, [6, p. 122])
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be saved by the ring of circularly moving bodies, which is noth-
ing but a local vortex both in terms of time and space? Why did
Descartes deny the existence of finitely small bodies (atoms)?
Why does he assert that matter is indefinitely divisible, which
means that it has no such small units that cannot be divided fur-
ther? We assumed that certain parts of the matter were infinitely
divided upon the creation of the world, and that a significant part
of the bodies filling the world are such particles divided into the
extreme (point-like bodies). The gaps between larger bodies are
not necessarily filled with finitely small bodies, but clusters of
these point-like bodies. In this case, only the volume and not the
shape of the clusters filling the gaps will be defined, and the clus-
ters will be able to fill the gaps with changing geometrical prop-
erties. That is, it can be stated that although bodies themselves
are not flexible and cannot be deformed, their clusters can be de-
formed. In principle, we can define the minimum percentage of
indefinitely small particles necessary to achieve this. This inter-
pretation is supported by Point II.34 of Principles of Philosophy,
that analyzes the formation of rings of circularly moving bodies
and talks about the preconditions for such formation, as well as
Point II.35, “. . . that I am not here speaking of the whole of this
matter, but merely of some part of it.” (Descartes, [3, II.35])
Fig. 4. Particles of various sizes tightly filling the space. Motion is
made possible by the smaller or even indefinitely small particles in between.
Cf. Descartes’s example of a tub filled with wine and grapes in Dioptrica.
4 Conclusions
In this study, it has been shown that the corpuscles of Carte-
sian physics are rigid and generally unable to change their form
and size. Furthermore, it is not possible for the corpuscles to
change their size while in motion, especially if no impact affects
them (they do not collide with each other, but move “evenly” in
a ring of circularly moving bodies).
We should resolve the contradiction between the “infinite di-
visibility of matter” and the constancy of the corpuscles by as-
suming the existence of point-like bodies. The argument that
the “infinite divisibility of matter” entails the change in the form
and size of the bodies during physical processes is presumed to
be wrong.
It has been proved that in a void, finitely small bodies would
only be able to perform regular vortex motions. The random mo-
tion of Cartesian rigid bodies is possible if a given proportion of
them are infinitely small, i.e., point-like. These point-like bodies
make up the clusters of matter with the ability of deformation be-
tween the larger bodies. Although finitely small bodies are able
to fill a given space at a given time without vacuum, this system
is incapable of a varied motion with a high degree of freedom.
It follows that rejecting vacuum and allowing the existence of
atoms rule out each other. If Descartes did commit to denying
vacuum, he could not but commit to the indefinite divisibility of
matter and to allowing the existence of infinitely small, point-
like bodies, all of which inevitably led to the denial of atomism.
Thus, it can be concluded that the existence of infinitely small
bodies is necessary whenever the paths of motion change, and
not only when the ring of circularly moving bodies is of an ec-
centric design, as illustrated in Figure 1. However, it is advisable
to add a remark to Descartes’ example. In Descartes’ physics,
it is not individual bodies but a mass of bodies that move in a
given cross-section within the ring of circularly moving bodies
(or during motion, in general). It is wrong to think that only one
body passes through a cross-section of a ring at any time and
that this body will “actually” divide. It is more appropriate for
us to visualize the ring as a river in which a mass of water parti-
cles flows, constantly adapting to the changing watercourse (the
external surface of the ring of circularly moving bodies) and the
whirling deposits (larger bodies in the ring of circularly moving
bodies). We can find explicit references to all these statements
in Principles of Philosophy II.34–35.
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